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Abstract: In his divisions of science, Peirce placed pedagogy in the branch of
practical sciences. This means that the profession of teaching can only be
meliorated by experience, through practice. However, I argue that a holistic
look at Peirce’s semiotics reveals an implicit philosophy of education. The key
lies in understanding his account of experience in the context of his theory of
evolution. By experience Peirce meant semiosis (action of signs), not the modern
empirical notion of experience. The sign, unlike an idea (purely mental entity)
does not belong strictly to mental or non-mental phenomena. Experience is a
characteristic of the Universe (CP 5.448), understood as a physiology of argu-
ments (Stjernfelt 2007). According to Peirce’s taxonomy of signs, learning is the
evolution of signification from the Icon sign type to the Argument sign type,
being the Universe’s way of discovering itself through life forms. The Argument
sign type is a result of agapasm, evolution due to creative love (CP 6.302). The
paper explains how Peirce’s theory of agapistic evolution underpins an educa-
tional paradigm.
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This paper applies Peirce’s agapistic principle of evolution to education. Charles
Peirce’s semiotics implies an experience based philosophy of education.
Therefore, to understand Peirce’s stand regarding education, an investigation
of his notion of experience is necessary. Peirce’s idea that pedagogy is a
practical science (CP 1.243) implies that no theoretical framework can improve
one’s teaching practice. However, Peirce left one main piece of advice for
teachers. This recommendation is found in his theory of evolution, and it is
the cornerstone of his mature semiotics: that the fulfillment of experience is
agapic, which he calls the Golden Rule (CP 6.288). This means that learning is
the manifestation of love.
I develop the argument in four stages. First, I explain Peirce’s pragmatic
notion of experience and its coextensiveness with biosemiotics. In the second
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stage I explain that, for Peirce, pedagogy is a practical science. The third stage
consists in explaining the implications of an evolutionary semiotics to learning.
Finally, I explain that Peirce’s practical pedagogy and his semiotics have the
same cornerstone, namely, the fulfilment of experience in agapic love.
1 Peirce’s pragmatic understanding of experience
Experience, on a Peircean account, is semiosis, a triadic cooperation: “... by
‘semiosis’ I mean... an action, or influence, which is, or involves, a coöperation
of three subjects, such as a sign, its object, and its interpretant, this tri-relative
influence not being in any way resolvable into actions between pairs”
(CP 5.484).
These three subjects, the sign-vehicle, or representamen (a quality), its
object (reaction) and an interpretant (mediation) together constitute a sign-
relation. Semiosis is always infinite, as any interpretant implies a relation to
another interpretant and so on: “A REPRESENTAMEN is a subject of a triadic
relation TO a second, called its OBJECT, FOR a third, called its INTERPRETANT,
this triadic relation being such that the REPRESENTAMEN determines its inter-
pretant to stand in the same triadic relation to the same object for some inter-
pretant” (CP 1.541).
This is the cornerstone of Peircean semiotics, and, therefore, of a Peircean
educational philosophy. Strand explained that on Peirce’s account of experience
as semiosis “we are dealing with a philosophy in experience” (Strand 2014: 436),
and not merely a philosophy of experience. Peirce clearly stated that we only
learn by experience. When stating this he also added that this account of
learning, of knowledge acquisition does not imply the tabula rasa assumption:
“Experience is our only teacher. Far be it from me to enunciate any doctrine of a
tabula rasa” (CP 5.50).
The main difference between Peirce and other pragmatists of his time is that
Peirce regarded pragmatism as a principle of logic that allowed him to develop a
relational logic, semiotics, while other pragmatists, such as William James or
John Dewey, did not focus on the action of signs, developing an account of
pragmatism as radical (extreme) empiricism (James 1907a; CP 3.414). Both of
these accounts of pragmatism aim at overcoming modern dualisms, such as the
separation of mind and matter.
Both versions of pragmatism, radical empiricism and semiotics, offer an
experience focused philosophy of education. Peirce’s follower, John Dewey,
was the first to develop a thorough pragmatic philosophy of education (1969,
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1997 [1938]). Pragmatic semiotics offers particular insights for philosophy of
education, on the account of experience as semiosis. Using Peirce’s notions of
sign and semiosis and his taxonomy of signs this paper explains education in
the light of Peirce’s theory of evolution. The conclusion is that, according to
Peirce, the rationale of education is self-sacrificial love (agapism). This is justi-
fied, in Peirce’s teleological and evolutionary semiotics, because the principles
of chance and necessity, while fundamental for learning, can be and are only
overcome by (agapic) love.
Pragmatism, at least in its early stages, was characterized by its emphasis on
a new understanding of experience, distinct from the mainstream, modern
empiricist or rationalist account. One of the novelties brought by pragmatism
that James explained is the strong awareness that experience is continuous, a
stream: “You must bring out of each word its practical cash-value, set it at work
within the stream of your experience. It appears less as a solution, then, than as
a program for more work, and more particularly as an indication of the ways in
which existing realities may be changed” (James 1907b: 53).
Dewey considered that a consciousness that contains successive but inter-
rupted experiences is pathological (1997 [1938]: 44). Semiosis, as well, is con-
tinuous (Stjernfelt 2007: Ch. 1; Bellucci 2013). Peirce explained what the
pragmatic account of experience offers new by contrasting it with John Mill’s
utilitarianism:
If Mill wishes me to admit that experience is the only source of any kind of knowledge, I
grant it at once, provided only that by experience he means personal history, life. But if he
wants me to admit that inner experience is nothing, and that nothing of moment is found
out by diagrams, he asks what cannot be granted. (CP 4.91)
The pragmatic notion of experience covers life in its wholeness; it is not merely a
sensory-perceptive matter. Imagination, which is mostly constituted of manip-
ulation of diagrams (Stjernfelt 2007), is experience as well. Therefore, Peirce
takes into account both inner and outer experience. Of course, semiosis is hardly
ever a strictly inner or outer practice of an organism. Semiosic reality is supra-
subjective (Deely 2001, 2009; Bains 2006); the action of signs is not bounded
within mentality or non-mentality. As such, Peirce’s semiotics rejects the mind
dependent/mind independent ontological distinction, which was taken for
granted by philosophical modernity starting with Locke and Descartes (Deely
1982, 2009). Pragmatism fundamentally argued that being is continuous
throughout mentality and non-mentality, this distinction not being ontological.
A living organism is engaged in semiosis and thus its being is relational.
Semiosis is continuous triadic interaction. The three termini of a relation of
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signification cannot be separated from each other: they have their being only
within the relation.
The distinction between Peirce’s notion of pragmatism and that of James
and Dewey consists in that for Peirce pragmatism is only a principle of logic.
One of its formulations is as follows: “Pragmatism is the principle that every
theoretical judgment expressible in a sentence in the indicative mood is a
confused form of thought whose only meaning, if it has any, lies in its tendency
to enforce a corresponding practical maxim expressible as a conditional sen-
tence having its apodosis in the imperative mood” (CP 5.18).
Peirce also named it “critical common-sense” (CP 5.494); his intention was
that of developing a doctrine of natural logic. James and Dewey did not intend to
develop a system of logic, but rather an overcoming of modern dualisms by a
theory of knowledge based on a more comprehensive notion of experience.
Since the version of pragmatism of Peirce’s students became quickly more
popular than his own, Peirce renamed his doctrine from pragmatism to pragma-
ticism (CP 3.414).
On the pragmaticist account, taking into consideration that experience is
semiosis, to be is to be in relation of signification. According to Peirce, semiosis
is the best explanation for the emergence of life, being coextensive with life and
essentially characterizing it:
In short, the problem of how genuine triadic relationships first arose in the world is a
better, because more definite, formulation of the problem of how life first came about; and
no explanation has ever been offered except that of pure chance, which we must suspect to
be no explanation, owing to the suspicion that pure chance may itself be a vital phenom-
enon. In that case, life in the physiological sense would be due to life in the metaphysical
sense. (CP 6.322)
On a Peircean account, experience is life itself, personal history. Semiosis
defines life. This hypothesis was further welcomed by two brands of theoretical
semiotics, namely, biosemiotics (biological semiotics, coined in Stepanov 1971,
for the present understanding of the term see Kull 2005) and edusemiotics
(semiotics of education, coined by Danesi in Semetsky 2009). The semiotic
approach to biology brought a new perspective on life, turning away from the
modern understanding of organism as functional mechanism. The first biologi-
cal theory by means of signs, belonging to Jakob von Uexküll (1926), already was
a holistic approach to life, whereby life would not be reduced to mechanist
functions (computation). Jakob von Uexküll explained the essential role of and
close relation between signification and life by the realization that with the
entities we interact, with anything at all, we can interact in the respect that
they are meaning carriers. An entity can serve as a terminus for various signs.
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A stone can have a “path tone,” together with the many stones constituting a
road but it can acquire a “throwing tone” if one throws it towards an attacking
dog. The physical and chemical changes that the stone suffers in this process are
minor if any at all, but something essential changed the stone: “a new meaning
was impressed upon it” (von Uexküll 1934: 140).
The realization of the close connection and coextensiveness of life and
semiosis further on leads to a non-mechanistic, holistic biology. The way in
which things come to signify in an organism’s environment determines the life of
the organism. A bone may be either food or a weapon for the same individual,
according to circumstances. This meaningful shaping of the constituting parts of
one’s environment leads to the realization of the close connection and coexten-
siveness of life and semiosis. Jakob von Uexküll’s concept of Umwelt, because it
explains the environment of an organism in terms of sign-relations, proved itself
a cornerstone concept for the project of a semiotic biology. It implies a non-
mechanistic, holistic account of biology: “Whosoever wants to hold to the
conviction that all living things are only machines should abandon all hope of
glimpsing at their environments” (Uexküll 1934: 41).
The same hypothesis was embraced by edusemiotics. Stables stated the
simple observation which is the cornerstone of edusemiotics: “If all living is
semiotic engagement, then learning is semiotic engagement” (Stables 2006:
375).
Therefore, on this account, life and learning are coextensive. They are
symptoms of each other. A living organism is recognized as something that is
learning.
Gough and Stables (2012) argue that interpretation is a matter of adaptation.
Interpretation (or semiosis), the action that has as result an Interpretant, is what we
refer to in common language by “learning”: when we learn the (semiotic) environ-
ment we readapt according to new parameters that evolutionary criteria set.
Stjernfelt (2011, 2014) considers that evolution itself had to adapt to struc-
tures of signification, such as, for instance, propositions. This is coherent with
Peirce’s teleology, whereas telos is set from within the system according to
present conditions (experience). Learning reveals what is next to be learned,
and this evolutionary learning is continuous.
The semiotic notion of experience underpins the assumption that learning is
interpretation, and, as such, it is a matter of adaptation. This led Peirce to the
idea that pedagogy is a practical science. Since it is adaptation itself, the
experience of learning, or, to be more precise, the learning evoked by an
experience has to be understood in the context of semiosic evolution. Peirce’s
semiotics implies an experience based philosophy of education grounded in his
theory of evolution.
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2 Pedagogy: A practical science
According to Peirce we only learn by experience, we learn because we are
immersed in infinite semiosis. He also considered that we only learn the art of
teaching by a practical experience of it.
For Peirce the characteristic feature of science is that it is observational (CP
1.238). This implies that there is a type of experience such as observation. What can
be observed is the subject of science, humans’ inquiry into, and towards, knowl-
edge. Peirce, continuing the Aristotelian tradition of the medieval divisions of
science, divided the sciences into two main branches: theoretical and practical
(CP 1.239). This implies that there are two types of observation, theoretical and
practical. Observation generally can be abductive, deductive, or inductive.
Abductive (or retroductive) theoretical observation, the logical operation of
“provisional adoption of hypothesis” (CP 1.68) underpins the retrospective
sciences, the redefining of hypotheses according to findings, and the active
science of mathematics, which is the active science of advancing new ideas
par excellence.
Deduction, which consists in a mental manipulation of diagrams (CP 1.66),
is found in mathematics but it mostly characterizes philosophy (coenoscopic
science), which “contents itself with observations such as come within the range
of every man’s normal experience, and for the most part in every waking hour of
his life” (CP 1.241). We perform deduction (at least) in every moment of aware-
ness, starting from the hypotheses we developed so far in order to understand
existence. Abduction and deduction together sketch an Umwelt. The difficulty of
philosophy stands in that it observes objects that might be so obvious that are
difficult to rethink of.
Induction, which asserts “the value of a ratio” by testing the results of
deduction (CP 1.67), mostly underpins the idioscopic sciences, which require a
special type of observation, such as a methodology, often implying special
training, tools for measuring, etc. (CP 1.242). It “consists in describing and
classifying the ideas that belong to ordinary experience or that naturally arise
in connection with ordinary life, without regard to their being valid or invalid or
to their psychology” (CP 8.238). This is where Peirce places disciplines such as
psychology, sociology, linguistics, and all the other disciplines developed from
philosophy. This is where modern philosophy tended to place pedagogy as well.
This is not so in Peirce’s case though.
Peirce described the other main branch of sciences, the practical sciences, as
sciences “for the uses of life” (CP 1.239). He placed pedagogy (pedagogics) under
this branch of science. It is the first example that Peirce gives among a disordered
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enumeration of practical sciences, which are “well-recognized sciences now in
actu, as pedagogics, gold-beating, etiquette, pigeon-fancying, vulgar arithmetic,
horology, surveying, navigation, telegraphy, printing, bookbinding, paper-making,
deciphering, ink-making, librarian’s work, engraving, etc.” (CP 1.239). This means
that pedagogy is not the subject of psychology, sociology, or anthropology, per-
spectives by which modernity used to approach it.
What the activities within the branch of practical sciences have in common
is that they cannot be taught on the basis of a theoretical background or any
systematic approach at all. Peirce’s theoretical sciences correspond to the med-
ieval liberal arts and the practical sciences correspond to the medieval utilitarian
arts. The practical sciences can be labelled as vocational. At a first glance this
might be discouraging for pedagogy, or at least for the prospect of developing a
semiotic of pedagogy. By placing pedagogy here Peirce explained that one
cannot be taught how to teach. This statement, actually, is a precious insight
for pedagogy and philosophy of education generally. In this way Peirce stated
that one can only meliorate her ability of teaching through the practical experi-
ence of actually teaching, or, perhaps, through observing others teaching. There
is no systematic way of teaching the science of teaching. It is a matter of
intimate knowledge, difficult if not impossible to communicate. One can of
course, show to another her methods of teaching, engraving, or deciphering
but there is no methodological teaching involved. It comes down to the observer
to discover the tools of the trade.
I argue that a broad look at Peirce’s work reveals that this assumption about
the science of teaching is a cornerstone of his semiotics. According to Peirce,
signification grows, it evolves ad infinitum. Signs grow not by being taught to do
so, but by learning themselves, in a certain sense. On a Peircean account,
Stjernfelt argued that evolution itself had to adapt to structures of signification
(2011, 2014). This can be taken as a definition of learning, as it defines the
specific character that qualifies a phenomenon of semiosis as learning: adapta-
tion to signification.
3 Evolutionary semiosis and learning
Peirce’s semiotics is a triadic teleological phenomenology. In a letter to Lady
Welby he explained that his idioscopic research led to the identification of the
three modes of being (CP 8.328). Being, in this sense is phenomenological.
Semiosis (the semiotic account of experience) proceeds in conformity with
Peirce’s three phenomenological categories, termed Firstness, Secondness,
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and Thirdness. Briefly, Firstness is populated by monads, Secondness by
dyads, and Thirdness by triads. Even though semiosis is infinite it is fully
described by three categories. The definition of semiosis underpins Peirce’s
observation that a triad is irreducible to a number of dyads and monads while
graphs of a higher degree are reducible to triads. The three categories are
defined as follows:
Firstness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, positively and without
reference to anything else.
Secondness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, with respect to a second
but regardless of any third.
Thirdness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, in bringing a second and
third into relation to each other. (CP 8.328)
Even though the three phenomenological categories correspond to three modes
of being, existence does not fall under any of these three categories. Real
existence is a triadic sign-relation of the three and none of the three is a priori
to the syncategorematic. This triad is the sign-relation. The sign has an element
of Firstness, namely, the Representamen, an element of Secondness, which is
the Representamen’s Object, and an element of Thirdness, the mediation of
Representamen and Object into Interpretant. Thus, signs are what populate
reality: “all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively
of signs” (CP 5.448). A semiotic account of the Universe is an Universe of
relations of signification, a web of signs. Since being itself is triadic relation
any of its three indispensable termini can be analyzed categorically. Thus, Peirce
found nine sign types. Stjernfelt also explains that Peirce found nine sign types
that describe being because each terminus of a triad can be analyzed in three
aspects: “As the sign consists of three components it comes hardly as a surprise
that it may be analyzed in nine aspects – every one of the sign’s three compo-
nents may be viewed under each of the three fundamental phenomenological
categories” (Stjernfelt 2007: 25).
3.1 Firstness: Learning
Peirce identified monads with qualities. Therefore, Firstness is the category of
qualities, and, as such, of pure possibility, freedom, and chance. It has no
structure, and, like any of the three categories, it is impossible to think of it
isolated from the other two. We cannot represent chaotically, unobjectified,
continuums of quality. Firstness is too simple to think of:
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Firstness is the mode of being which consists in its subject’s being positively such as it is
regardless of aught else. That can only be a possibility. For as long as things do not act
upon one another there is no sense or meaning in saying that they have any being, unless
it be that they are such in themselves that they may perhaps come into relation with
others. The mode of being a redness, before anything in the universe was yet red, was
nevertheless a positive qualitative possibility. And redness in itself, even if it be embodied,
is something positive and sui generis. That I call Firstness. We naturally attribute Firstness
to outward objects, that is we suppose they have capacities in themselves which may or
may not be already actualized, which may or may not ever be actualized, although we can
know nothing of such possibilities [except] so far as they are actualized. (CP 1.25)
Therefore, in signification, the elements of Firstness will manifest in rela-
tions among qualities. The relation of sharing of qualities is termed similarity
(Stjernfelt 2007: 75). Mere similarity does not constitute a relation of significa-
tion, but once to a similarity a direction is added one of the most basic types of
signification is embodied. If x is similar with y it means that x can signify y. If x
signifies y it does not necessarily imply that y signifies x. Because signification is
a matter of use, that is, because “a sign is only a sign in actu by virtue of its
receiving an interpretation” (CP 5.569) signification is not necessarily bidirec-
tional. Similarity is bidirectional. Similarity with a direction, similarity in actu,
constitutes the simplest relation of signification. This phenomenon of significa-
tion due to similarity is called iconicity (Stjernfelt 2007: 75). Peirce chose the
term Icon, arguably a proper choice from an etymological point of view (on the
medieval concept of icon see Lock 1997), for the sign of similarity:
An Icon is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes merely by virtue of characters of
its own, and which it possesses, just the same, whether any such Object actually exists or
not. It is true that unless there really is such an Object, the Icon does not act as a sign; but
this has nothing to do with its character as a sign. Anything whatever, be it quality,
existent individual, or law, is an Icon of anything, in so far as it is like that thing and used
as a sign of it. (CP 2.247)
The only sign that has a more simple constitution even than the Icon is the
Qualisign, a signifying quality. While the Icon, in its Firstness, has an element of
Secondness, namely, the direction of signification, the Qualisign lacks this
element of Secondness. However as soon as a Qualisign is used in some
sense, it acquires a direction of signification, and, therefore, a Qualisign cannot
be used without evoking an Icon. Therefore, iconicity is the most basic significa-
tion that we encounter in our Umwelten, in our waking hours of life. Peirce
identified ten classes of signs, resulting from combinations of his basic nine sign
types, that we encounter in actual experience. The first class coincides with the
Qualisign type. However, the Qualisign as a class is not a sign that is a quality,
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but a “quality in so far as it is a sign” (CP 2.254), that is a quality within a sign.
By identifying the Qualisign as a phenomenon of experience Peirce states that
any sign needs to have inherent qualities. He explained that “Since a quality is
whatever it is positively in itself, a quality can only denote an object by virtue of
some common ingredient or similarity; so that a Qualisign is necessarily an
Icon.” (CP 2.254)
This leads to acknowledging the important role that Icons play in learn-
ing. According to Peirce the icon is the sign by which we can learn more
than what actually constitutes it: “For a great distinguishing property of the
icon is that by the direct observation of it other truths concerning its object
can be discovered than those which suffice to determine its construction”
(CP 2.279).
On account of this Stjernfelt considers that “the most decisive feature in
icons at all” is “the fact that they are the only signs through the contemplation
of which it is possible to learn more” (2007: 78). Hence, iconicity evokes learn-
ing. One of the potentialities of the Icon is that it can evolve into a Predicate
(Rheme, as Peirce also refers to the Predicate). A Predicate is necessarily devel-
oped upon an Icon:
The only way of communicating an idea is by means of an icon; and every indirect method
of communicating an idea must depend for its establishment upon the use of an icon.
Hence, every assertion must contain an icon or set of icons, or else must contain signs
whose meaning is only explicable by icons. The idea which the set of icons... contained in
an assertion signifies may be termed the predicate of the assertion. (CP 2.278)
The Predicate (or Rheme) is a sign of Firstness that, in its Firstness, presents an
element of Thirdness. Prediction (or predication) is part of our continuous
deduction characterizing our waking life:
Five minutes of our waking life will hardly pass without our making some kind of
prediction; and in the majority of cases these predictions are fulfilled in the event. Yet a
prediction is essentially of a general nature, and cannot ever be completely fulfilled. To say
that a prediction has a decided tendency to be fulfilled, is to say that the future events are
in a measure really governed by a law. (CP 1.26)
Since Firstness is the category of infinite possibility, signification of Firstness is
highly fertile in potential for learning. Iconicity is therefore the source for
creativity. Stjernfelt considers that, even though in many cases the discovery
of similarity might be a trivial observation, what we usually look upon as a
creative idea consists in discovery of similarities as well. The sharing of a quality
by two phenomena can be obvious and not necessarily useful but also insightful
and not necessarily obvious:
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The fact that it has never before been asserted that this orange on the table before me is
similar in shape to the moon (given a certain granularity of similarity classes), might cause
sensible souls to see me as a genius for creating metaphors, but, modestly, it seems
strange that this similarity should be something created by me. I merely discover (no
great effort) this similarity by applying a certain tertium comparationis (a circle, give or
take a certain rate of deformation). In rare cases, of course, it may take great pains to
establish a new complicated tertium comparationis to see a similarity (Newton discovering
the similarity between the movement of the apple and of the heavenly bodies, Eliot
discovering the similarity between cruelty and the growth of April flowers). (Stjernfelt
2007: 57)
Once a similarity was discovered, once a sign comes into play, it cannot be
undone. After it occurred for the first time that the movement of celestial bodies
is similar in certain aspects with the falling of an apple it is very difficult to deny
it. The changing of such hypotheses is never their refutation merely, but,
according to how signification expands from the hypothesis within the continu-
ously evolving learning phenomena, the hypothesis might be subjected to
abduction, and, thus, modified. Abduction is mostly a play of Icons.
From this perspective something is possible if it can be the Interpretant of an
Icon. That an Icon of a table, and an Icon of a unicorn are possible is evidence
that a table and a unicorn are real possibilities. An Icon of a round square is not
possible because between round and square there is no similarity that can be
applied as predicate. Round cannot be predicate for square or vice versa.
Signification of Firstness is, therefore, the domain of real possibilities:
The idea of First is predominant in the ideas of freshness, life, freedom. The free is that
which has not another behind it, determining its actions; but so far as the idea of the
negation of another enters, the idea of another enters; and such negative idea must be
put in the background, or else we cannot say that the Firstness is predominant. Freedom
can only manifest itself in unlimited and uncontrolled variety and multiplicity; and
thus the first becomes predominant in the ideas of measureless variety and multiplicity.
(CP 2.302)
Biosemiotics defined life as local plurality (Kull 2007), measureless variety and
multiplicity in some sense. Life cannot be measured. Therefore, neither can
learning. A biological science that measures life reduces life to mechanisms
and the same would an educational philosophy do to learning by trying to
measure it. This is what attempts at evaluating students do, ultimately. This is
the implication of the two assumptions that, on the one hand signification is
infinite (CP 2.92), unlike mere information (Eco 1976), and that life is semiotic
engagement. To assert what another learned is ultimately impossible. An organ-
ism does not have access to another organism’s intimate knowledge, to its
intimate life. The Umwelt, as much as it belongs to a species, belongs also to
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an individual. The Umwelten of two individuals of the same species will be very
similar, essentially more similar than the Umwelten of two individuals of differ-
ent species. However, the Umwelten of each individual is unique and unrepea-
table no matter how close to identical two individuals are physiologically. They
are nevertheless distinct and therefore engaged in different phenomena of sig-
nification, to some degree. Therefore, a teacher cannot expect to have full access
to a student’s knowledge. Neither can a teacher simply put or add an under-
standing upon a student’s understanding. On a semiotic account learning does
not consist in an addition of information, but in semiosis by which the horizon
of real possibilities expands for an organism. This is manifested by (1) the
individual organism’s reshaping of her hypotheses (abduction), which leads to
(2) the possibility of performing new deductions and, therefore, (3) new
inductions.
3.2 Secondness: Teaching
Learning starts as Firstness, in absolute freedom. The phenomenon of learning,
as a phenomenon of signification occurring in absolute freedom, cannot be
subjected to any limitation. This implies some problems for teaching, which
borders the freedom of random exploration. Teaching is objective, that is it
points out specific objects of knowledge that a learner has to inquire about. As
such it is described by signification of Secondness, which consists in actual,
brute dyadic action:
The actuality of the event seems to lie in its relations to the universe of existents. A court
may issue injunctions and judgments against me and I not care a snap of my finger for
them. I may think them idle vapor. But when I feel the sheriff’s hand on my shoulder, I
shall begin to have a sense of actuality. Actuality is something brute. There is no reason in
it. I instance putting your shoulder against a door and trying to force it open against an
unseen, silent, and unknown resistance. We have a two-sided consciousness of effort and
resistance, which seems to me to come tolerably near to a pure sense of actuality. On the
whole, I think we have here a mode of being of one thing which consists in how a second
object is. I call that Secondness. (CP 1.24)
Teaching is such a two-sided consciousness. It is a reaction between student and
teacher: one who is learning becomes aware of another’s brute action of impos-
ing a different learning. Teaching, as such, is externally imposed learning. As a
dyadic reaction teaching has no reason. Teaching appears to be meaningless
because it imposes learning on an already learning subject. All the more, it
obscures learning since it imposes a different learning than one already in
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process. The student is a knowing subject in her own right, there is no justifica-
tion for an externally imposed switch from one object of her learning to another.
Yet, society, learning institutions, and the teacher impose on her something
which might not fit with her Umwelt. Her signifying world might not nurture an
interest for the objects the teacher is having her learn. For example, in her
waking time one might be enjoying looking closely at flowers and swimming
and for her own self there is no justification for solving equations. Yet, the
teacher demands that she looks at equation instead. It is brute action, without
any reason.
Teaching is mostly characterized by indexicality, signs that point out to a
certain object:
An Index is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes by virtue of being really
affected by that Object. It cannot, therefore, be a Qualisign, because qualities are whatever
they are independently of anything else. In so far as the Index is affected by the Object, it
necessarily has some Quality in common with the Object, and it is in respect to these that it
refers to the Object. It does, therefore, involve a sort of Icon, although an Icon of a peculiar
kind; and it is not the mere resemblance of its Object, even in these respects which makes
it a sign, but it is the actual modification of it by the Object. (CP 2.248)
Indices can only be developed upon Icons. Teaching understood apart from
learning is an empty concept. It is useless to think of teaching independently
of some learning and, in the same time, the two manifest a contradiction. Any
dyadic relation presents a contradiction between its two termini. From a Peircean
perspective an incomplete triad is meaninglessness. Thirdness is the category of
meaning, of mediation between three elements. A dyad is an incomplete triad.
Learning and teaching in light of each other, or a student-teacher relation, are
absurd. The question that arises is “why teach someone who is already learn-
ing?” As argued above, the iconically preponderant learning that any organism
does, according to its own semiotic capabilities (stemming from shape of body,
size, the stream of personal experience, etc.), is an effective and creative expan-
sion of and into signification. The organism can discover signification and
develop predicates on its own. An answer to the question stands in that, as
explained above, the absolute freedom of iconic signification is not perturbed by
any thresholds between fictional and non-fictional reality: both a table and a
unicorn are possible. Arguably, organisms have to adapt to non-fiction in a
peculiar way. It is a matter of survival that a human being can abduct and
deduct whether there is an actual, non-fictional tiger behind the bush in front
of her. Not distinguishing between fiction and non-fiction is mostly regarded as
pathological. Signification as actuality becomes necessary therefore. Stables
(2012) explains that what makes learning possible is also what sets boundaries
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to it, an idea which Peirce touched upon as well (CP 5.613): “It is an important
truth little acknowledged in educational theory that that which makes knowledge
and understanding possible – our interpretive frameworks including our assump-
tions and prejudices – is also that which limits them” (Stables 2012: 47).
The predications that one discovers by herself, by simply being alive and
engaging with the environment, also limit her understanding. She develops and
Umwelt that might be incompatible in some regards to other Umwelten. This is
why in some cases a student might not have much to gain from listening to a
teacher: they do not discover in their Umwelten a common ground by which
signification can evolve.
Semiotics accounts that reality, being of one piece, both evokes infinite
possibilities and restricts them according to its own syntax. The contradiction
between learning and teaching still remains. Historically, society proved to look
upon genuine, valuable abduction as pathological as well. We can invoke
examples from Socrates to Galileo Galilei and to Charles Peirce and Albert
Einstein.
Learning is evoked by freedom but by necessity it requires an actual restric-
tive imposition, teaching. A way of trying to solve the learning/teaching contra-
diction is that of teaching within the conditions of learning. According to
Peirce’s categories actual objects are constituted by qualities, not the other
way around. This is to say that the indices that education imposes on a learner
have to be developed upon the learner’s icons. Only an icon can develop into a
predicate. To have learned something is to be able to use it as a logical
predicate. If the student cannot find potential predicates in the teacher’s dis-
course learning is obscured. This is certainly so, there is no secret in that
teaching something that has no similarity to something previously known is
useless. An iconless index is pointless: nothing pointing at nothing. It is almost
irrelevant to teach about horses to one who has never seen a horse or a depiction
of a horse (Nöth 2014: 447). An index can evolve into a Symbol by signifying its
Object by an association of ideas, but an iconless Symbol is an empty concept, a
floating in void, functionless variable. There is no point in teaching chemistry in
Spanish to a learner who does not understand Spanish.
Using something as a predicate proves to have learned it. However, testing
whether a student has learned a specific concept, a specific structure of sig-
nification, is impossible because signification is not repeatable. However,
because of its general character, signification can be replicated. Signs can be
used through their replicas, which are signs in their turns. A phenomenon of
signification identical with another one is impossible, but the hypothesis of
iconicity accounts that phenomena of signification can and ought to be similar.
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If something is not similar with everything else within the Universe of signs it
does not belong to this Universe. Anything that is possible, at least in this
Universe, is similar to everything else. For this reason a teacher must not search
for identity between her knowledge and that of the student: there is no identity.
Their knowledge can be similar though, that is, they have to find iconic sig-
nification relating their knowledge. Once similarities are discovered between
teacher and student they become accessible to each other because they can
develop predicates together. This opens the possibility for performing abduction
caused by the knowledge of the other: the student and the teacher can change
their own understanding because they have access to another web of signs, the
knowledge of the other.
3.3 Thirdness: Learning and teaching mediated
To teach upon someone else’s signification, iconic or otherwise, it is very
difficult if not impossible. We do not have access to another organism’s life.
What another organism learned freely, by chance, is not accessible to me.
Signification (experience) is not repeatable. The question still stands: why and
how to teach?
The answer lies in Peirce’s third category, in signification of Thirdness. The
mediation of learning and teaching is the rationale of the relation. We learn by
chance and we teach because of necessity. Chance and necessity are criteria
belonging to the first two phenomenological categories. According to Peirce, as
the sign is threefold, evolution is as well. The first two criteria of evolution are
chance and necessity. The modes of evolution by the criteria of chance and
necessity Peirce termed tychasm and anancasm (CP 6.302). Since chance and
necessity evoke learning and teaching and they are a First – Second dyad there
has to be another criterion of evolution which mediates this dyad towards
Thirdness. This criterion, according to Peirce, is love (agape), and the mode of
evolution driven by love is agapasm:
Three modes of evolution have thus been brought before us: evolution by fortuitous
variation, evolution by mechanical necessity, and evolution by creative love. We may
term them tychastic evolution, or tychasm, anancastic evolution, or anancasm, and aga-
pastic evolution, or agapasm. The doctrines which represent these as severally of principal
importance we may term tychasticism, anancasticism, and agapasticism. On the other hand
the mere propositions that absolute chance, mechanical necessity, and the law of love are
severally operative in the cosmos may receive the names of tychism, anancism, and
agapism. (CP 6.302)
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This triadic teleological evolution of signification is the cornerstone to Peirce’s
semiotics and to his view on education. Evolution of signification starts from
relations among signifying qualities, Icons, leading up to the Argument sign type:
Therefore, if you ask me what part Qualities can play in the economy of the universe, I shall
reply that the universe is a vast representamen, a great symbol of God’s purpose, working
out its conclusions in living realities. Now every symbol must have, organically attached to
it, its Indices of Reactions and its Icons of Qualities; and such part as these reactions and
these qualities play in an argument that, they of course, play in the universe – that Universe
being precisely an argument. In the little bit that you or I can make out of this huge
demonstration, our perceptual judgments are the premises for us and these perceptual
judgments have icons as their predicates, in which icons Qualities are immediately pre-
sented. (CP 5.119)
The argument is the fully developed sign, signifying its Interpretant in its
Thirdness: “An Argument is a sign which distinctly represents the Interpretant,
called its Conclusion, which it is intended to determine” (CP 2.95).
All the other sign types partake in its constitution. Signification grows
towards the Argument. The Argument is mostly thought of as copulations of
propositions, which are constituted by Indices, having the role of subjects, and a
Predicate. It can also be a Symbol (a general inferred from an actual similarity)
used as a Predicate. The Argument is always infinitely distant, even though by
learning we asymptotically approach it more and more.
Stjernfelt (2007) describes the Peircean account of the Universe as a phy-
siology of arguments. The category of Thirdness is populated by universals, also
termed generals, laws, and tendencies. Peirce understood laws as tendencies,
not rigid functions which repeat invariantly. Interpretants, mediation generally,
are tendencies of the semiotic Universe. This is why Peirce’s teleology is not
fixed in pursuing one established goal, but telos itself varies according to
evolution of signification. Induction depends on the outcomes of deduction
which depends on the outcomes of abduction and so on in never-ending
loops. These loops are circular, but not identical with each other. They are
spiral, coming closer and closer to Truth, to the ultimate Argument which is
always infinitely distant. The Argument, itself being beyond understanding,
gives the Universe purpose, and, therefore, signification.
The purpose of learning and of education is to pursue the Universe as
argument. The practice of teaching is justified and, according to Peirce, it is
only possible by agapism, evolution by love. Both argumentation and agapism
are matters of Thirdness. This implies that signification can only evolve towards
argumentation by the principle of agapism. This is the quintessence of a
Peircean approach to education and the practice of teaching. Signification is
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continuous, a stream, and chance and necessity are always present: “At any
time, however, an element of pure chance survives and will remain until the
world becomes an absolutely perfect, rational, and symmetrical system, in
which mind is at last crystallized in the infinitely distant future” (CP 6.33).
Agapasm holds that love transcends (mediates) chance and necessity, not
that it eradicates them. Peirce’s semiotics is a triadic logic, by this denying the
principle of excluded third (Semetsky 2005). Mediation is not the dismissal of
the mediated termini. Peirce termed this doctrine of continuity synechism and he
states that synechism “calls for” agapistic evolution (CP 6.289). For two reasons
it might seem strange that Peirce finds love to be the ultimate criteria of
evolution. Firstly, it is quite a challenging, novel idea itself. Secondly, there is
a persisting confusion about Peirce’s logic and particularly about his central
idea that signification is continuous. By stating that synechism calls for agapism
he explained that because the Universe constitutes in continuous relations it is
founded and can only evolve by love, by a going out of the self. As for the first
objection, if the idea of love being a criterion for evolution is strange for the
modern mind, Peirce would simply invoke his usual dismissal of modern skepti-
cism by abduction: “Let us not pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not
doubt in our hearts.” (CP 5.265)
4 Pedagogy revisited: Learning and loving
In Section 2, I explained that for Peirce pedagogy is a practical science. It can
only be meliorated by practice. Peirce’s evolutionary, teleological semiotics
offers the insight by which pedagogy is practiced: engagement in learning and
teaching has to be characterized by love. This is so because love is the only
possibility of growth. To love is to go out of the self, in search for the other, it is
expansion of signification par excellence. For Peirce love is the only possibility of
growth. His sources for this idea are St Apostle John’s scriptural writings, where
the idea that Divinity is love is clearly articulated (1 Jn 4). Peirce explained:
Everybody can see that the statement of St. John is the formula of an evolutionary
philosophy, which teaches that growth comes only from love, from I will not say self-
sacrifice, but from the ardent impulse to fulfill another’s highest impulse. Suppose, for
example, that I have an idea that interests me. It is my creation. It is my creature; for as
shown in last July’s Monist, it is a little person. I love it; and I will sink myself in perfecting
it. It is not by dealing out cold justice to the circle of my ideas that I can make them grow,
but by cherishing and tending them as I would the flowers in my garden. The philosophy
we draw from John’s gospel is that this is the way mind develops; and as for the cosmos,
only so far as it yet is mind, and so has life, is it capable of further evolution. Love,
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recognizing germs of loveliness in the hateful, gradually warms it into life, and makes it
lovely. That is the sort of evolution which every careful student of my essay “The Law of
Mind” must see that synechism calls for. (CP 6.289)
Growth comes only from love, for Peirce there is no other source for growth. As
well, Learning is growth. Learning, teaching, and scientific observation are
activities pursued by human beings. Science is a mode of experience character-
istic for humans: “Such being the essence of science, it is obvious that its first
offspring will be men – men whose whole lives are devoted to it” (CP 1.236).
Having in mind that semiosis is taken as the explanation for the emergence
of life and that signification is continuous growth, an interconnection between
life, learning, and love is becoming clear. Learning has science as its purpose
and Peirce regards it as a vital phenomenon, a matter of metabolism: “Let us
remember that science is a pursuit of living men, and that its most marked
characteristic is that when it is genuine, it is in an incessant state of metabolism
and growth” (CP 1.232).
Science is not an abstract endeavor that would be better practiced by purely
objective, algorithmically functioning machines. Living humans observe, research,
and endlessly perfect abduction to scientific argumentation. Argumentation is
strictly bounded to agapism, they are both phenomena of Thirdness, of mediation.
Agapism is the principle by which signification can grow towards the Argument.
On this account, arguably, life is the Universe’s way of discovering itself. On the
cosmological level of evolution something, perhaps an agapic drive, led the
Universe to discover itself. As long as within the Universe there was no conscious-
ness or no way of life at all, it could know itself. Living beings are part of the
physiology of arguments and inherit the logical syntax of this physiology.
Discovery, knowledge, a capacity of living beings generated an exponential
acceleration of evolution. Some living beings, among which human beings, devel-
oped their Umwelt by the experiences of teaching and researching. Such modes of
signification growth are particular to some species and even some individuals and
Peirce understands science as a personal matter. As an Interpretant, as a phenom-
enon of growing tendency, knowledge belongs to the future self: “This reference to
the future is an essential element of personality. Were the ends of a person already
explicit, there would be no room for development, for growth, for life; and
consequently there would be no personality. The mere carrying out of predeter-
mined purposes is mechanical” (CP 6.157).
Life, in its richness of variety and multiplicity, life as local plurality, can
learn. The particular mode of scientific learning is already personal as, arguably,
love is as well. The Learning – Teaching contradictory dyad is mediated in a
Learning – Teaching – Science (research) triad. It is a semiosis. Research, the
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mediation, gives teaching a rationale. This rationale is love, because love makes
growth possible. When a student and a teacher practice scientific observation
they are doing so together, their phenomenal worlds overlap (Stables 2012) and
they can signify together. The purpose and sole rationale of teaching is not the
mere addition of information to the existing knowledge of a knowing subject,
but cultivating love. On account of Peircean semiotics love generates variety and
multiplicity, enriches life, that is. Life is the sine-qua-non for learning. We do not
love facts or abstract ideas, but we love people, persons who are close to us:
The movement of love is circular, at one and the same impulse projecting creations into
independency and drawing them into harmony. This seems complicated when stated so;
but it is fully summed up in the simple formula we call the Golden Rule. This does not, of
course, say, Do everything possible to gratify the egoistic impulses of others, but it says,
Sacrifice your own perfection to the perfectionment of your neighbor. Nor must it for a
moment be confounded with the Benthamite, or Helvetian, or Beccarian motto, Act for the
greatest good of the greatest number. Love is not directed to abstractions but to persons;
not to persons we do not know, nor to numbers of people, but to our own dear ones, our
family and neighbors. “Our neighbor,” we remember, is one whom we live near, not locally
perhaps but in life and feeling. (CP 6.288)
Like semiosis, love is circular. It is not a matter of ethics, but of life. It makes
learning possible by revealing beauty. Knowing, discovering the physiology of
arguments mesmerizes us:
The Universe as an argument is necessarily a great work of art, a great poem – for every
fine argument is a poem and a symphony – just as every true poem is a sound argument.
But let us compare it rather with a painting – with an impressionist seashore piece – then
every Quality in a Premiss is one of the elementary colored particles of the Painting; they
are all meant to go together to make up the intended Quality that belongs to the whole as
whole. That total effect is beyond our ken; but we can appreciate in some measure the
resultant Quality of parts of the whole – which Qualities result from the combinations of
elementary Qualities that belong to the premisses. (CP 5.119)
Being always beyond our ken, our observation of the Universe is not a necessity
that can be satisfied. The Universe makes sense because semiosis is always
infinite (Nöth and Santaella 2011). As such, knowing and learning are not
necessities, in a mechanical sense, but vital phenomena. The rationale of the
student – teacher relation is not that of adding information or revealing expla-
nations, but a cultivation and mutual practice of love which leads to growth of
signification. If we could satisfy, consume all possibilities of signification by
accumulation of information reality would be meaningless. The Umwelten of
teacher and student come together, they are enlarged, and they discover each
other. Intersubjective experience is possible because reality is populated with
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suprasubjective being. Stables refers to this semiosic capacity as overlapping of
phenomenal worlds (Stables 2012). Love alone is a reason, the Argument, for
intersubjective engagement. It reveals the insufficiency of the self, “for self-love
is no love” (CP 1.287), and its vital need for relation to otherness, thus generating
local plurality and it leads to self-sacrifice, not for a functional necessity such as
the survival of the species, of a social group or of some cultural values, but for
the sake of the other herself: “For it is not knowing, but the love of learning, that
characterizes the scientific man” (CP 1.44).
Peirce does not use the predicate love to refer to the mere appreciation of the
activity of learning. Learning implies love for another person, a student or a
teacher, as love is directed towards persons and to love one-self does not allows
the possibility of growth. The love of learning is love for the teacher, for the one
from whom the self learns. The love of self is only mechanical necessity
(Secondness), not mediation towards the other and growth of signification
(Thirdness). On this account, love and science, as surprising as this might be
for modern philosophy and for the modern ideal of an objective science, make
each other possible. Therefore, the key to a Peircean, semiotic pedagogy, is
engagement in love. Thus, pragmaticist pedagogy claims that to love the other,
the student or the teacher, is the practical experience that evokes, justifies, and
fulfils education.
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